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Title: Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings by David J. Chalmers ISBN: 0-19-514581-X Publisher: Oxford University Press Pub. Date: July, 2002 Format: Paperback Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $48.95 |
Average Customer Rating: 5 (1 review)
Rating: 5
Summary: Outstanding collection of papers
Comment: This is an outstanding collection of papers, the most comprehensive probably ever published, on the issues relating to the philosophy of mind. They range from classical considerations such as the Cartesion dichotomy to modern analytical philosophy. They're really too diverse to summarize here, but if you already have a background in the subject, this book would be a great way to get up to date on what's going on.
This is an area I've worked in myself, and I thought I'd add a few more of my own comments to the debate, by way of considering a certain proposition. This is the statement that "You cannot know who you are and be who you are simultaneously. I owe the Canadian philosopher, Stephen Garvey, for this fascinating question, and he did the very interesting thing of opening up a "philosophy competition" to debate this proposition on a website he created expressly for this purpose. My background is both in philosophy and psychobiology, and so I would like to consider this proposition in the the light of that information.
Although it may be difficult to overcome this proposition, I don't see that the statements that we cannot know who we are and be who we are simultaneously are necessarily mutually exclusive.
Because of the existence of the condition "at the same time," this proposition really has three parts, not just two. If we can in fact know who we are at certain moments in time, and be who we are at certain moments in time, but these moments are contiguous but not overlapping, then we have achieved two of the three conditions. Then the only issue that remains is the one of simultaneity.
If it is thought that this is in fact the case, then the problem really comes down to a matter of the temporal exclusivity of the two main statements, and whether this one issue can in fact be overcome.
However, if we concede that being is a constant as long as we are alive, and that it cannot be isolated into discrete moments of time, then in that case, the condition of simultaneity can be removed for the statement "be who we are" since our being is not simultaneous with anything, it is simply continuous or a constant. If this is conceded, then the proposition is overcome if one can attain knowledge of one's self or who we are at any point during our existence.
In regard to the above, Garvey asked, "What is behind our knowing that allows us to know who we are without being who we are? How can we know, eat, or walk without being who we are?" I don't think that is possible either. However, even if it is conceded that knowledge, and perhaps even the knowledge of who we are, is not a constant and may be fragmentary or isolated in time, this is not a problem if it can be demonstrated that we can know who we are at any point in time (no matter how infinitesimally small) while we exist, which as we have concluded, is a constant.
Therefore, if during a typical lifetime of 70 years or so (a period comprised of approximately 2.2 billion seconds) we are able to know who we are for even a second, or even a millisecond during that period, we shall know who we are and be who we are simultaneously, and the proposition is overcome.
Then the problem really comes down to what is acceptable proof of the knowledge of who we are. Garvey pointed out that this is really a matter of knowing who we are either as what we know or knowledge as form, and the temporal exclusivity argument from the standpoint of being as a temporal constant. Since we have conceded being is a constant, there is nothing inherent in being itself that precludes the possibility of knowing who we are and being who we are simultaneously.
Therefore, is there anything in knowing who we are that precludes it from being simultaneous with being who we are? If it is conceded that it is not then we are now much closer to overcoming the proposition.
Anyway, just a few comments of my own on the thorny problem of the mind-brain question that are appropos of the subject of the current book.
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Title: The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Philosophy of Mind Series) by David J. Chalmers ISBN: 0195117891 Publisher: Oxford University Press Pub. Date: October, 1997 List Price(USD): $19.95 |
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Title: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates by Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan, Güven Güzeldere ISBN: 0262522101 Publisher: MIT Press Pub. Date: 08 August, 1997 List Price(USD): $44.95 |
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Title: Consciousness Explained by Daniel C. Dennett ISBN: 0316180661 Publisher: Back Bay Books Pub. Date: 20 October, 1992 List Price(USD): $16.95 |
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Title: The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind (Blackwell Philosophy Guides) by Stephen P. Stich, Ted A. Warfield ISBN: 0631217754 Publisher: Blackwell Publishers Pub. Date: March, 2003 List Price(USD): $34.95 |
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Title: Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind by Tim Crane ISBN: 0192892975 Publisher: Oxford University Press Pub. Date: November, 2001 List Price(USD): $22.95 |
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