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Title: Fuentes De Onoro: Wellington's Liberation of Portugal (Campaign 99) by Rene Chartrand, Patrice Courcelle ISBN: 1-84176-311-X Publisher: Osprey Pub Co Pub. Date: February, 2002 Format: Paperback Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $18.95 |
Average Customer Rating: 3 (1 review)
Rating: 3
Summary: An Unsatisfying Account
Comment: Although René Chartrand has produced many fine volumes of military history for the Osprey Campaign series, he appears to be in a slump lately. His latest volume, Fuentes de Onoro 1811, picks up where his last volume Bussaco 1810 left off. Like Bussaco, Fuentes de Onoro is well-researched and well-written but essentially unsatisfying. Part of the fault might be attributed to the subject, which is one of the most dreary and futile campaigns of the Napoleonic Wars - it's hard to imagine anyone writing a gripping account about a poorly-led, half-starved French army stumbling through the mountains of Portugal and returning to Spain with its tail between its legs. However part of the fault also appears to lie in the rather slap-dash manner in which this account was written, particularly compared to Chartrand's earlier works on the French and Indian Wars.
Fuentes de Onoro begins in standard Osprey format with a section sketching the origins of the campaign, the opposing plans and a chronology. The section on opposing leaders is far too brief and covers only French corps commanders and senior leaders like Picton and Crauford. Critical French commanders like Montbrun, Mermet, Marchand, Solignac and Ferrey and the British division commanders Spencer and Houston receive virtually no mention. Louis Montbrun, one of Napoleon's best cavalry leaders, deserves more than the single sentence he receives in this account. In particular, Chartrand should have mentioned that Montbrun led the amazing charge at Somosierra in 1808 and had served with distinction in the 1809 campaign in Austria. Information on Spencer, commander of the 1st Division at Fuentes de Onoro, might have been helpful; Spencer was a poor choice to command a critical position on the battlefield. Finally, the portrait of Massena presented here does not do justice to this once great marshal of France. Massena was an old 53 at Fuentes de Onoro while Wellington was 42. Three years before Fuentes de Onoro, Massena lost an eye in a hunting accident when he was accidentally shot by Napoleon (who blamed Berthier), and then fought despite injuries in the slug-fests at Aspern-Essling and Wagram in 1809. Chartrand might have been a bit more sympathetic; Massena needed a rest in 1810-1811, not a mission impossible with inadequate forces.
The section on opposing armies, all 4 ½ pages of it, is totally inadequate. On the other hand, the order of battle provided in the appendix is excellent, with unit strengths provided for all units down to regimental-level. There are five 2-D maps (the Peninsula in 1810, troop movements in November 1810-March 1811, Massena's retreat, armies in the Peninsula in June 1811) and three 3-D "Birds-eye View" maps (the attack of Ferey's Division on 3 May 1811, and two maps of the main battle on 5 May 1811). Three excellent battle scenes are provided: an artillery position in the Lines of Torres Vedras, the charge of Montbrun's cavalry at Fuentes de Onoro and the British counterattack in Fuentes de Onoro). Chartrand provides bibliographical data, including archival sources in Portugal.
The first 37 pages of the campaign narrative cover the Anglo-Portuguese construction of the Lines of Torres Vedras protecting Lisbon, and the French inability to penetrate these defenses. The success of the Lines of Torres Vedras should stand as a shining example for those armchair military strategists who espouse the "futility of fixed defenses" theory. Unfortunately, Chartrand provides very little information on Allied dispositions on the lines or the French probe at Sobral. Only one hard-to-read period map of the lines is provided, instead of a user-friendly modern 2-D map. Plenty of modern pictures of Portuguese scenery is provided but these do not allow a reader to appreciate the strength of these positions. Another aspect revealed in this section is the total failure of French intelligence concerning not only the lines but the terrain in Portugal, which impeded the French invasion.
The actual battle of Fuentes de Onoro is covered in the last 28 pages. The fact that the French were able to surprise Wellington and crush his right flank with well-coordinated infantry and cavalry attacks, driving the British back 3 miles, is given less credit than Wellington's effort to refuse his crumpled flank divisions in order to form a new front. The French pushed back the British in a 2-1 odds attack using columns against lines but that doesn't seem to rate any analysis. There are many questions here but few answers. Why was French artillery so weak in this battle - which should have been addressed in the opposing armies section. Why were the French infantry divisions of Loison's corps unable to continue the attack against Wellington's refused flank? Why was Marshal Bessieres out of command control of his brigade of imperial cavalry at a critical moment in the battle? Why had the British not fortified and barricaded Fuentes de Onoro after the initial French attack on that town two days before the main battle?
The author concludes that Fuentes de Onoro was a British victory since the French threat to Portugal was removed but an incomplete victory, since the Army of Portugal slipped away. Fuentes de Onoro is a difficult battle to evaluate. The French threat to Portugal ended before the battle because Massena had no answer to the Torres Vedras lines, so it is misleading to attribute strategic results to a battle that was close to a tactical draw. On the battlefield itself, the French failed to relieve the siege of Alameida or to cripple Wellington's army - which was Massena's immediate objectives - or even to seize Fuentes de Onoro. On the other hand, by turning and attacking, Massena did help restore morale in a French army that had only seen retreat and frustration for months. The ability of the French to mass cavalry and infantry columns probably impressed Wellington enough that the French were still dangerous opponents and view as a spoiling attack, Fuentes de Onoro probably helped to delay Wellington's invasion of Spain until 1812.
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