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Title: Fin De Siecle: The Meaning of the Twentieth Century (Library of International Relations (Series), V. 3.) by Alex Danchev ISBN: 1-85043-967-2 Publisher: I.B. Tauris Pub. Date: January, 1996 Format: Hardcover Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $65.00

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Rating: 3
Summary: A brave attempt to add something new
Comment: Reviewed by VLADIMIR MATVEYEV in International Relations, Volume XIII, No 2, August 1996

The authors of this study deserve credit for their brave attempt to add something new to a topic which has already been thoroughly explored by such eminent authors as Francis Fukuyama, Alexandre Kojève and Paul Kennedy to name but a few. Written by noted British specialists from the fields of international relations, history and politics, the reader might be expecting dire conclusions about 'the End of History' which, to Kojève at least, meant an end to the arts and philosophy, to wars and revolutions, and the reversion of humanity to an unreflective brutish way of life. Here, however, the authors' aims, the scope of the study and its conclusions are far more modest and far less startling. They concentrate on analysis of a number of regions and cover those problems, such as the nuclear factor, the economy, nationalism and community, which they believe to be most relevant to international relations now and in the not too distant future. The remark that particular periods or 'ages' can be no more than labels of convenience is characteristic of their approach to the subject.
In contrast to some of their predecessors, who were fascinated by the prospect of speculative thinking on the eve of the new millennium and aimed at predicting no less than the destiny of mankind, the authors of this book evidently prefer traditional methods of academic research based on facts and data which can be proven. This leads them, on a number of occasions, to draw different conclusions to their predecessors. Thus, Professor Chris Brown from the University of Southampton, while agreeing with the self-evident thesis of Fukuyama that something momentous has happened in this century, challenges Fukuyama's statement that this something momentous is the indisputable victory of 'Western liberalism' over the last remaining alternative - i.e. the Soviet Union. Moreover, he completely disagrees with the stipulation that this victory brings about the 'End of History'. Professor Brown rightly remarks that for a number of reasons the failure of the Soviet model of socialism cannot be treated as sufficient proof of the irrelevance of socialist values in principle, even if that were highly desirable. 'On the contrary', as Professor Brown notes, 'there is every reason to think that the most successful capitalist societies in Europe at least have been those which are based on a strong social democratic tradition - Federal Germany in particular. Nor does it mean that the basic ethical impulse of socialism ... is in any way outmoded or passé.' Professor Brown equally challenges another of Fukuyama's, and especially Kojève's, forecasts about the inevitable peacefulness of the international order in a situation where the world is dominated by liberal market-oriented states. The facts speak in favour of Chris Brown's more pessimistic evaluation. Recent dramatic conflicts in Europe and in other parts of the world have already shown that the victory of liberal economic values and political democracy does not necessarily guarantee the peaceful international behaviour of a state. Here, his reference to the increasing power of nationalism following the collapse of the socialist system of states, and its pernicious effects on international relations, is very germane.
Chris Brown's comments on the role of nationalism are consonant with the conclusions of Professor James Mayall of the London School of Economics who elaborates on the theme in a separate chapter. Having analysed the most far-reaching episodes of twentieth-century history, Professor Mayall concludes that nationalism will continue to dominate world politics into the new century. There are good reasons to believe that he is not mistaken. Thus, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism has not heralded the start of a new era of peacefulness in international relations. On the contrary, these events have reopened the national question, the implications of which are impossible to foresee. In any case, the international conflicts of the 1980s and '90s, with a strong flavour of nationalism behind them, have clearly demonstrated the limitations of the post-1945 international system.
It is probably too early to predict what changes in the international system might bring about a reduction in the negative influence of aggressive nationalism. However, as James Mayall remarks, 'one sombre reality must be acknowledged: if states with deep ethnic and religious divisions and no dominant political culture are to survive their internal communal passions and the predations of their neighbours, there will have to be international guarantees, and probably military intervention, of a kind and scale never previously envisaged'.
Turning to the regional chapters, for understandable reasons I shall focus on the coverage of Russia. This is skilfully done by Professor Edward Acton of the University of East Anglia. 'Whereas the twentieth-century history of some societies may be written as drama, and perhaps a very few as comedy, that of Russia and the Soviet Union is unmistakably tragedy.' It is both a sad and a true remark. The author does not confine himself to portraying the evils of the country which ceased to exist, at least in its original form. He is attempting to interpret the deep-rooted reasons lying behind the national disaster and its implications for the people of Russia and for the world community. Unlike some of his colleagues, who tend to put all the blame for the troubles of the Soviet Union on the planned economy and see its collapse as proof of the victory of market values, Professor Acton is not so sure that the final verdict has yet been pronounced. A number of convincing facts of Soviet history bear witness to the fact that Soviet-style planning did not correspond to the classical model of a planned economy, where all parts should, in the words of Hayek, be 'carefully adjusted to each other'. It is therefore not clear what exactly failed: Soviet mismanagement of the economy or the idea of central planning as such. Acton's views on the interrelationship between planning and democracy are also worth noting. In contrast to Hayek's view that planning destroys democracy, the Soviet experience suggests that the absence of democracy ruined planning. 'The absence of democracy', stresses Acton, ' was the very root of the disease from which the Soviet economy suffered. Peasants did not seek collectivization or identify with collective farms; workers did not feel themselves masters of their own destiny; managers and officials scarcely more ... How far it may be taken with democracy remains to be seen.'
In his concise but thorough analysis of the roots and consequences of the dominant role of the United States in world affairs of the twentieth century, John Thompson, of St. Catherine's College, Cambridge, comes to the conclusion that it was the scale of American power that enabled the United States to achieve great influence in the world at relatively small cost. For example, notes Dr. Thompson, victory in the Second World War established the United States and the Soviet Union as the dominant powers; it cost the latter at least 26 million dead, the former 323,000. Yet John Thompson's analysis implies that in the twenty-first century America's role in international affairs will be both smaller in extent and rather different in nature.
In his introduction to the book, the editor, Professor Alex Danchev of Keele University, writes that he and his colleagues sought to intermingle the cognate fields of history, politics and international relations, and particularly to strengthen intellectual links between international history and international relations. They have succeeded in doing so but will have left directors of many academic libraries in doubt about the proper place for this book in their domains. Perhaps the end of the century will bring about closer links, if not a synthesis, between previously distinct academic disciplines as so greatly desired by the authors.
VLADIM