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Title: Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign by Scott Bowden, Bill Ward ISBN: 1-882810-65-1 Publisher: DaCapo Press Pub. Date: December, 2001 Format: Hardcover Volumes: 1 List Price(USD): $34.95 |
Average Customer Rating: 4 (31 reviews)
Rating: 5
Summary: A Compelling and Refreshing Look at Gettysburg
Comment: Bowden and Ward provide a well-researched and compelling look at one of the most researched and written-about battles in American history. I have read more than 20 books about Gettysburg and countless others on Lee's generalship. "Last Chance for Victory" was one of the most thought-provoking and compelling books on this topic I have ever read.
The author's analysis of Day Two of the battle is a refreshing look at the many controversies surrounding the battle and Lee's battle plan. Their analysis of President Davis's decisions prior to the Gettysburg Campaign and Stuart's famous and controversial "ride" also were refreshing and compelling.
In addition to forcing readers and historians to reassess traditional concepts about Lee and Gettysburg, this work is well researched.
Most important, it is well-written. The text flows easily and in many instances it reads like a novel.
I could not put it down.
This book is a must buy for any serious student of the Civil War or military history. It is also approachable for those new to the Civil War and Gettysburg.
Whether you agree with the authors' final conclusions or not, you should read this book. You will never think the same way about Gettysburg and Lee again!
Rating: 2
Summary: One sided view of Gettysburg
Comment: This isn't actually a study of the Battle of Gettysburg so much as a study of Robert E. Lee's generalship there, and even then, it should be noted that it's really a defense of his generalship. Somewhere in the front of the book there's talk of an objective critical analysis, or something to that effect. Depends on your point of view, of course, but I wouldn't call it that at all. More along the lines of a nearly complete exoneration, something Lee himself never did or even tried to do.
For one thing the book has an almost relentless pro-Confederate bias, in all aspects of its arguments. One example will suffice. In the early stages of the book, while discussing Lee's early career, the authors note that the U.S. Army in Mexico paid for all the food they foraged from the residents, which is true. The authors then opine that this probably was Lee's cue to act similarly during the 1863 campaign in Pennsylvania. This is one of those hoary old myths that deserve to be put to rest. The Army of Northern Virginia did pay for all the livestock and food they took while they were in the North---in useless Confederate paper money! They didn't pay, however, for the several hundred African-Americans (escaped slaves and freedmen) that they kidnapped and took south with them when they retreated. Neither of these two facts makes Lee look like the gallant cavalier the authors want you to be thinking of, however, so you need to ignore the little man behind the curtain for a minute while they regale you with the great general's gallantry.
This is just the start, however. Everyone, it seems, made mistakes at Gettysburg. Davis goofed in not reinforcing Lee's army before it headed north. This is the only place I've ever heard the fantastic argument that Lee should have been reinforced from the west, rather than the other way around. The authors make the point that only in the east could the war be won by the Confederate army (as opposed to simply avoiding defeat) and feel that defeat in the west, at least in the short run, wasn't decisive. The part they leave out is that while victory in the east was possible, it would have been very difficult to pull off, and the Union armies there would have had an equally difficult time (and did, in actuality) defeating Lee's army. If Lee had reinforced either the Johnston/Pemberton armies, or Bragg's facing Rosecrans, the situation in the west might have recovered some, and it's difficult to see how things in the east would have been much worse. True, the farmers in northern Virginia would have had to endure Yankee occupation for another summer, but can anyone imagine Hooker (still in command of the army, presumably) doing anything intelligent, given a second chance?
One major emphasis of the book is that Lee's plan for the battle, and the orders that he gave laying these things out, were basically brilliant, and that scores of other historians (Alan T. Nolan, Harry Pfanz, Edward Coddington, Glenn Tucker) simply don't understand the fine points of Lee's brilliance. The famous discretionary order to take Cemetery Hill given to Ewell at the end of the first day turns out to be peremptory, with the phrase "if practicable" just a courtesy. His resignation after the battle was an attempt to cover for incompetent subordinates. The authors argue that Lee's system of making suggestions rather than giving orders basically never existed, or at least wasn't in use here, when everyone else agrees that it did and was. Most other historians prefer Richard M. McMurray's point that the suggestion command system only really ever worked when Lee was in command of the army, with Jackson, Stuart, and Longstreet his principle subordinates.
Instead this book goes on and on, repeating and hammering home the arguments that Lee made few mistakes until the third day of the battle (which, by a weird coincidence, gets the least coverage by far of the three) and that all of the responsibility for the defeat rests with Lee's subordinates, and Davis' refusal to reinforce the army before the battle. One side point: Longstreet is relatively gently handled, and rather extensively praised for his handling of his part of the second day's attack, which the authors see as achieving its objectives. This is one of the points that the author's make which is actually worthwhile: they believe that the assault on the second day was intended to lead to an attack by Dorsey Pender's division, which would have captured Cemetery Hill, and which was derailed when Pender was mortally wounded by an artillery shell. This is actually a good point, but the authors manage to obscure it. They also think Hood's wounding earlier had a negative effect. They do tend, however, to think that if things went according to plan, the Union army would have been powerless to stop the Confederates, and never consider the riposte that Meade would have come up with for a particular stratagem.
Lastly, I must concur with the one reviewer who complained about the typos. There are numerous errors; they detract from the book greatly. I also can't see what the various Dale Gallon paintings are doing in a serious history of the battle.
It's been a long time since I've read such a polemic history of anything. You almost never come across a book which criticizes other books by respected works on the subject as "flat wrong" and "mistaken." The authors have a habit of cherrypicking too. When Glenn Tucker praises Lee, he's brilliant, but when he criticizes him...you get the picture. There are some good points here, but I can't recommend the book for anyone but the most serious student of the battle, and he needs to be aware of the bias of the book prior to putting it to use, or at least recognize it.
Rating: 5
Summary: Fantastic book about Lee's decision making during Gettysburg
Comment: This book is really fantastic. Several books do exist that presents more details about the actual battle, whereas this book assumes that the reader has at least a certain degree of previous knowledge of Gettysburg.
However this book is really fantastic in the description and the analysis of Lee's plans and decision making during the Gettysburg campaign.
It analyses the information available at the time the decisions were made and makes clear what the possible choices were.
It is a fundamental book to understand Lee's art of war and his and his lieutenants behaviour during the battle.
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Title: Gettysburg by Stephen W. Sears ISBN: 0395867614 Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Co Pub. Date: 24 June, 2003 List Price(USD): $30.00 |
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Title: The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War by Brent Nosworthy ISBN: 0786711477 Publisher: Carroll & Graf Pub. Date: June, 2003 List Price(USD): $35.00 |
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Title: Pickett's Charge--The Last Attack at Gettysburg by Earl J. Hess ISBN: 0807826480 Publisher: Univ of North Carolina Pr Pub. Date: 05 November, 2001 List Price(USD): $34.95 |
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Title: The Fredericksburg Campaign: Winter War on the Rappahannock by Francis Augustin O'Reilly ISBN: 0807128090 Publisher: Louisiana State University Press Pub. Date: January, 2003 List Price(USD): $39.95 |
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Title: The Gettysburg Campaign : A Study in Command by Edwin B. Coddington ISBN: 0684845695 Publisher: Touchstone Books Pub. Date: 01 March, 1997 List Price(USD): $25.00 |
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